Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society by Andersen, Steffen et al.
1 
 
 
Gender, Competitiveness and Socialization at a Young Age:  
Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society 
 
Steffen Andersen* 
Seda Ertac 
Uri Gneezy 
John A. List 
Sandra Maximiano 
 
September 2010 
 
 
Abstract:  Economists and other social scientists typically rely on gender differences in 
the family-career balance, discrimination, and ability to explain gender gaps in wages 
and in the prospect for advancement.  A new explanation that has recently surfaced in the 
economics literature is that men are more competitively inclined than women, and having 
a successful career requires competitiveness.  A natural question revolves around the 
underlying determinants of these documented competitive differences:  are women 
simply born less competitive, or do they become so through the process of socialization? 
To shed light on this issue, we compare the competitiveness of children in matrilineal and 
patriarchal societies to show that the difference starts around puberty.  Moreover, most of 
the changes during this period of life are within the patriarchal society, in which 
boys become more competitive with age while girls become less competitive. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In most societies around the world men earn more money than women and are 
more likely to hold high status jobs.
1
 Recent findings suggest that some of the gap may 
result from different tendencies of men and women to compete.
2
 A stylized fact in this 
literature is that increasing the competitiveness of the environment results in differential 
change in effort between men and women, with men putting in more effort when the 
incentives are competitive.  Such data patterns might provide insights into why we 
observe a higher fraction of women than men among, for example, grammar school 
teachers, but the reverse among high level executives.  
Gender differences in competitiveness may have some evolutionary reasons, and 
are not unique to humans; a large body of literature in evolutionary biology and socio-
biology documents differences in competitiveness between males and females in many 
species.
3
 While the evolutionary or “natural” basis of gender differences is well 
documented, our understanding of the effect of culture on the gender gap is more limited. 
To that end, Gneezy, Leonard and List (2009) study two distinct societies, the Massai of 
Tanzania and the Khasi of Northeast India. The comparison between the two societies is 
important because they represent very different cultures in terms of gender roles. While 
the Massai are a textbook example of patriarchal society, the Khasi are a matrilineal 
society. The main objective in that study was to examine whether women and men in 
more gender-equal societies compete at a different level than women and men in non-
equal societies.   
                                                 
1
 For example, Altonji and Blank (1999); Blau and Kahn (1992; 2000); Blau, Ferber, and Winkler (2002).   
2
 Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003); Gneezy and Rustichini (2004); Niederle and Vedsterlund (2007). 
3
 See Knight (2002) or Tregenza and Wedell, (2002) for recent overviews. The debate is a classic in the 
field: see Darwin, (1871), Bateman, (1948) and Trivers, (1972). 
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Gneezy, Leonard and List (2009) find that the gender gap in the patriarchal 
society is similar to that found in western societies. However, the gender gap is reversed 
in the Khasi matrilineal society, where women compete more than men. This result 
provides strong evidence against the nature straw man, showing that socialization is also 
important in determining competitiveness.  An important question that is left open is at 
what age the gender difference begins. Answering this question could help us in both 
understanding the source of the gender difference and devising potential policies to 
reduce it. 
To that end, the current paper reports the results of experiments with 7 to 15 year- 
old children in matrilineal and patriarchal villages in Northeast India. The main finding is 
that there are no gender or society differences in our experiments at the age of 7, but that 
by the age of 15, there is a strong gender gap. The average behavior of children in the 
matrilineal society does not change relative to that of the 7 year-old. In particular, boys 
and girls are equally likely to choose to compete. In the patriarchal society, on the other 
hand, 15 year-old boys are significantly more likely to compete than 7 year-old boys, and 
the reverse is true for girls. As a result, we observe a strong gender gap in the patriarchal 
society at the age of 15. This gap is similar to the one found with adults. Hence, it 
appears that the source of the gender gap is in the period when the children hit puberty. 
Apart from the contribution of our findings to the understanding of the source of 
the gender gap, the results also provide important insights into the design of public 
policies. They suggest that a policy maker interested in reducing the gender gap should 
target children around the puberty age, in which the policy might be most effective.  
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II. Brief Societal Background 
We ran our experiment in matrilineal and patriarchal villages in the same general 
region of Meghalaya in Northeast India. The matrilineal villagers in our study belong to 
the Khasi tribe, while the patriarchal villagers are of the Kharbi tribe. The Kharbi are 
considered to be the closest to the Khasi in terms of biology and origin. The two tribes 
are located in the same region and engage in similar economic activities. Yet, the social 
organization of the two societies is quite different. In the Khasi, inheritance and clan 
membership always follow the female lineage through the youngest daughter. Family life 
is organized around the mother’s house headed by the grandmother who lives with her 
unmarried daughters, her youngest daughter (even if she is married), and her youngest 
daughter’s children. Additionally, her unmarried, divorced, or widowed brothers and sons 
reside in the home. Even in cases when married men reside with their wife’s family, they 
spend much, if not most, of their time in the mother’s or sisters’ household (Van Ham, 
2001, Nakane 1967). Women are therefore raised from infancy in their mother’s or 
grandmother’s home. Importantly, the youngest daughter never leaves and eventually 
becomes the head of the household, whereas older daughters usually form separate 
households adjacent to their mother’s household. Further, women never join the 
household of their husband’s family and some men leave their mother’s household to join 
their wife’s household. In some cases, men will practice duolocal marriage (in which they 
live in both their mother’s and wife’s households).  Men, and in particular husbands, 
frequently hold roles that seem to mirror those of women in patriarchal societies. The 
Khasi husband dwells in a household in which he has no authority or property, and is 
expected to work for the gain of his wife’s family. The status of men in Khasi society has 
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in fact been the source of a men’s rights movement (Ahmed, 1994; Van Ham, 2000; 
Nonbgri, 1988). 
The Kharbi society, on the other hand, is organized in the usual patriarchal 
structure, in that men possess ownership of the land and have power over monetary 
decisions of the household. Lineage also descends through the male, and women move to 
the household of their husband when they get married. These differences in social 
structure provide a unique opportunity for studying how attitudes toward competition 
across gender vary over culture. Having data on the choices of children of different ages 
can especially help us understand the time course of the gender differences, by giving 
insight into the potential effects of gender socialization in each type of society.  
 
III. Experimental Design:  
We collected data from four villages in the Meghalaya district of Northeast India 
in November 2008. Two of these villages were matrilineal, and two were patriarchal. In 
total, 318 children aged 7-15 participated.
4
 The children were recruited through an 
announcement made in the village school, and with the consent of their 
parents/guardians. We have data from 75 girls and 71 boys in the patriarchal villages, and 
from 76 girls and 96 boys in the matrilineal villages.
5
  
After showing up for the experiment, children were randomly assigned ID 
numbers, and instructions were explained to them in the local language (Khasi or Kharbi, 
                                                 
4
 5 additional participants were excluded from the analysis because they were below the age limit of 7. 
Inclusion of those observations does not change the results.   
5
 Since the participant pool consisted of children in the village school, our sample is thinner in the older age 
groups in our age range because of attrition.  
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depending on tribe).
6
 The experimental task was throwing tennis balls into a bucket that 
was placed 10 feet away. This task was chosen because it is simple to explain and 
implement, and previous work (Gneezy, Leonard, List (2009)) had established that there 
are no gender differences in ability, which is also confirmed by our findings. As 
expected, however, task performance improves with age, and we therefore use 
performance as a control in our regressions. 
The children were told that they would have 5 chances to throw a ball into the 
bucket, and could choose between two payment options. The choice of incentives was the 
only choice the participants in our experiment were asked to make. The piece-rate option 
paid 10 Indian Rupees per successful shot (the ball had to enter the bucket and stay in it), 
and only depended on the participant’s own performance.7 The second option was a 
tournament payment scheme in which earnings depended on the comparison of the 
subject’s performance to that of a randomly-matched subject from another group of 
participants. This option paid 30 Rupees per successful shot if and only if the participant 
outperformed the randomly selected participant that he/she was matched with. In case of 
a tie the subject who chose the tournament option was paid 10 Rupees per successful 
shot; if the subject was less successful than the opponent then he/she was paid nothing. 
  After the task was explained, the children were taken into a room in groups, 
where there were buckets placed 10 feet away from a line. Each child knew that they 
would be matched with someone from outside their group. They were (privately) asked 
their choice of payment scheme, and were also asked about their age and their grade in 
                                                 
6
 Instructions in English are provided in the appendix.  
7
 Ten Rupees were about 25 American cents at the time, and about an hour wage at the villages we studied. 
This level of incentives was chosen in order to provide high enough motivation, without causing choking 
under pressure (Ariely et al, 2009). 
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school. After this, the children completed the task and were directed to another location 
where they were paid their earnings in cash. As promised, the children were never given 
the opportunity to learn with whom they were paired. 
 
IV.  Results 
 Figure I and Table I shows the frequency of competition choice across gender, 
age and societal structure. We see no significant differences in competitive behavior 
across gender or culture for the younger children aged 7-9 or mid-aged children aged 10-
12.
8
 However, by the age of 13-15 patriarchal girls exhibit a significantly lower 
propensity to compete compared to boys of the same age in the same villages (p<0.05). 
Older boys in the patriarchal villages also compete significantly more than younger boys 
in the same patriarchal villages. Thus overall competitive behavior differs across gender 
in the patriarchal villages, where boys become relatively more competitive, and girls 
become relatively less competitive as they get older. In the matrilineal villages we find no 
statistical differences in any of the age groups, though we do see a tendency for older 
girls to become more competitive and boys to become relatively less competitive. 
 
<Insert Table I> 
 
 Table II presents the marginal effects of a logistic regression. The coefficients 
reflect the change in probability to compete in percentage points if the characteristics 
change from false to true. The reference point is patriarchal boys aged 10 to 12 years of 
                                                 
8
 All tests of differences in means reported in the results sections are the findings of a non parametric 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  
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age. We find no overall significant effect on the margin of gender, age or culture, but we 
do reveal interesting and significant patterns.  
 
<Insert Table II> 
 
We find no gender or socialization effects on competitive behavior in children 
below the age of 13. Interestingly, however, while the older matrilineal boys do not have 
a significantly higher probability of competing than older matrilineal girls (p<0.36, Wald 
test), older patriarchal boys have a significantly higher probability of competing 
compared to older patriarchal girls (p<0.01, Wald test).  
For robustness, we also run regressions using age as a continuous variable instead 
of age group dummies, allow for village level effects, control for school grade, gender of 
experimenter, and research assistant running the session as well. None of these controls 
or specifications alters the main result. In addition, and in order to explore any possible 
effects of the undersampling of post-puberty children in our data, we revisited two of the 
villages in 2009, recruiting more teens. Acknowledging that we might have contaminated 
behavior by returning to the same villages we do not include this data in our main 
analyses, though it confirms our results. Figure 1B and Tables 1B and 2B in Appendix B 
display the competition patterns over age with the addition of these data.  
Overall, we see no difference in competitive behavior across gender and culture 
for children aged 7-12, but we do see significant differences in our older group, aged 13-
15. In particular, in the patriarchal society boys in this age group are more likely to 
choose to compete than girls.  
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The differences in children’s behavior can be contrasted with the behavior of 
adults in these societies, as reported in Gneezy, Leonard and List (2009), who find 
essentially the same results as we find with the older children: adult men in the 
patriarchal society choose to compete more than women, while in the matrilineal society 
they do not.  
Our findings are interesting in comparison to some other work on the propensity 
of kids to compete. Gneezy and Rutichini (2004) compared the speed of 10-11 year old 
kids in running alone and running side by side with another kid during a physical 
education class in Israel. They report that girls were not affected by running next to 
another kid, but boys invested more effort (ran faster) when they were matched. Two 
recent experiments tested this finding in other countries. Dreber et al. (2009) finds that 7-
10 year-old boys and girls in Sweden have similar reactions (in terms of performance) to 
competition in running, skipping rope and dancing tasks. On the other hand, Sutter and 
Rützler (2010) find that boys choose to compete more (in math and running tasks) across 
all ages in a sample of three to eighteen year old Austrian children. These studies lend 
further support to the hypothesis that culture and social structure are important 
determinants of the gender gap in competitiveness over age.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In most cultures men are more likely to have a successful career outside of the 
household than women. One explanation for this difference is that men are more 
competitive than women, and having a successful career requires competitiveness. This 
10 
 
begs the question of nature versus nurture: are women born less competitive, or do they 
become so through the process of socialization?  
The gender difference in competitiveness is based on findings from patriarchal 
societies (e.g., Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003). In a recent paper, Gneezy, 
Leonard and List (2009) report results comparing men and women’s tendency to compete 
in matrilineal and patriarchal societies. The main result is that in matrilineal societies 
women are not less competitive than men. This implies that socialization has an 
important role in creating the gender difference.  
An important open question is at what stage in the socialization the gender 
difference arises. By comparing competitiveness of children in matrilineal and patriarchal 
societies we show that the difference starts around puberty. Moreover, most of the 
changes during this period of life occur within the patriarchal society, in which boys 
become more competitive with age while girls become less competitive.
9
  
Apart from increasing our understanding of basic human tendencies, this finding 
could also help in guiding public policies. A social planner wishing to reduce the gender 
gap in, e.g., wages may want to direct the effort towards children during the early teens, 
because this seems to be the period in which the gap is starting.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9
  It is important to note the possibility that socialization might act along with biological forces in 
determining the difference in the matrilineal and patriarchal societies around puberty. According to the 
gender intensification theory in psychology (Hill and Lynch (1983)), the physical changes of puberty 
reinforce socialization agents to increase pressure for sex-typed behavior (Rose and Rudolf (2006)). 
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Figure I: 
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TABLE I: Frequency of Competitive Choices 
 Age Group 
 1. 7-9 Years old 2. 10-12 Years 
old 
3. 13-15 Years 
old 
All 
 
Patriarchal Girls 
 
 
 0.34 (0.08) 
[35] 
 
 
0.58 (0.10) 
[24] 
 
0.18   (0.10) 
[16] 
 
0.38   
(0.06) 
[75] 
 
Patriarchal Boys 
 
 
 
0.45  (0.09) 
[31] 
 
0.48 (0.10) 
[25] 
 
0.66  (0.13) 
[15] 
 
 
0.51  
(0.06) 
[71] 
 
Matrilineal Girls 
 
 
 
0.55   (0.1) 
[27] 
 
0.42  (0.08) 
[35] 
 
0.50  (0.14) 
[14] 
 
 
0.48  
(0.06) 
[76] 
 
Matrilineal Boys 
 
 
0.53  (0.08) 
[45] 
 
0.56  (0.09) 
[34] 
 
0.42 (0.12) 
[17] 
 
 
0.52 (0.05) 
[96] 
 
All 
 
 
0.47  (0.04) 
[138] 
 
 
0.51 (0.05) 
[118] 
 
0.44 (0.06) 
[62] 
 
 
 
Note: means as main number, standard deviation in parentheses, and number of 
observations in brackets. 
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TABLE II: Marginal Effects of Logistic Regression 
  
Younger -0.03 
(0.17)    
Older  0.21 
(0.20)    
Girls  0.16 
(0.17)                      
Younger girls -0.27 
(0.21)      
Older girls -0.51*** 
(0.07)   
Matrilineal -0.06 
(0.20)  
Younger Matrilineal  -0.03 
(0.20)  
Older Matrilineal -0.30 
(0.19)  
Matrilineal girls -0.28 
(0.17)  
Younger Matrilineal girls  0.37* 
(0.19)  
Older Matrilineal girls  0.55*** 
(0.05)  
Performance -0.03 
(0.03)  
  
Note: Younger denotes children aged 7-9, 
Older denote children aged 13-15. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; clustering was 
used on each group sent in for competition. 
Controls for village and room-level effects 
added. *’s denote significance at levels; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Based on 318 
observations.  
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Instructions: 
 
Welcome. Today you are going to play a game that takes 20 minutes.  By playing the game, you 
have the chance earn money. All the money you earn will be yours to keep. It will be paid to you, 
in private, after the game ends. No one will know how much money you earned, unless you 
choose to tell them yourself. Now we will explain the rules of the game. The rules are very 
simple. Pay very careful attention to these instructions because the better you understand them, 
the more money you can earn. Please do not talk with each other from this point on. If you have a 
question, you can raise your hand and ask.  Otherwise, please be quiet and listen carefully just 
like you listen to your teacher in school. 
 
The task that you will do is to throw this ball into this bucket from this line. (Show them the ball, 
bucket and line). You will have 5 chances to throw balls.  Before you start throwing, you will be 
asked to choose between two ways of earning money: 
   
Option 1 (Individual payment): If you choose this, you receive 10 Rupees for each ball you throw 
in successfully. One ball in, you get 10 Rupees. 2 balls in, you get 20 Rupees. 3 balls, 30 rupees 
and so on... 
 
Do you have any questions?  
 
Option 2 (Competition): If you choose this option, you will be competing with another kid. Every 
one of you will be matched with either a girl or a boy from another group, who will be playing 
the same game (throwing balls). We will not tell you who the kid you will be competing with is. 
If you can throw more balls in than your opponent, you will win the competition. If you throw 
fewer balls in than your opponent, you will lose the competition. For example, if you throw in 3 
balls successfully and your opponent throws 2 balls successfully, you win the competition and 
your opponent loses. If you throw in 3 balls successfully and your opponent 4 balls successfully, 
you lose the competition and your opponent wins. If you and your opponent make the same 
number of successful shots, it’s a tie. 
 
Now, if you choose to compete and you lose, you do not get any money. But if you win, you will 
be paid 30 rupees for every ball you got in, instead of 10. That is, for one successful throw, you 
will get 30 rupees. For 2 successful throws, you will get 60 rupees. For 3 successful throws, you 
will get 90 rupees and so on. But you will only receive this if you beat your opponent. If you do 
worse than your opponent, you get zero. If you both succeed the same number of times, it is a tie. 
In that case you will get 10 rupees for each successful throw. 
 
Do you have any questions?  
 
In a few minutes, we will take you inside to play this game. When you go inside, we will ask you 
privately which option you would like to choose. We will never tell anyone which option you 
chose. We are going to keep this as a secret even after the game is over.  
 
Do you have any questions? Now, let’s see if we all understand:  
 
 (Ask control questions to the whole group) 
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 “If I choose the individual payment (that is, if I do not choose competition), and I throw 
in 3 balls successfully, how many rupees do I get?” 
 “If I choose to compete and I throw in 3 balls successfully and my opponent makes 2 
balls, how many rupees do I get?  
  “If I choose to compete and I throw in 4 balls successfully and my opponent throws in 5 
balls, how many rupees do I get?  
 
Do you have any questions?  
 
OK, we will now take you inside to play the game and make your choices.  
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APPENDIX  B: ADDING ADDITIONAL DATA 
 
Figure I B: Pooling Data from Revisited Villages 
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TABLE 1B: Frequency of Competitive Choices,  
with Data From Revisited Villages Pooled 
 Age Group 
 1. 7-9 Years old 2. 10-12 Years 
old 
3. 13-18 Years 
old 
All 
 
Patriarchal Girls 
 
 
 0.30 (0.07) 
[40] 
 
 
0.54 (0.09) 
[35] 
 
0.26   (0.06) 
[47] 
 
0.35 (0.04) 
[122] 
 
Patriarchal Boys 
 
 
 
0.45  (0.09) 
[33] 
 
0.53 (0.09) 
[30] 
 
0.55  (0.08) 
[44] 
 
 
0.51 (0.05) 
[107] 
 
Matrilineal Girls 
 
 
 
0.55   (0.09) 
[29] 
 
0.34  (0.06) 
[64] 
 
0.39  (0.07) 
[49] 
 
 
0.40 (0.04) 
[142] 
 
Matrilineal Boys 
 
 
0.54  (0.07) 
[46] 
 
0.43  (0.06) 
[68] 
 
0.46 (0.06) 
[63] 
 
 
0.47 (0.04) 
[177] 
 
All 
 
 
0.49  (0.04) 
[148] 
 
 
0.43 (0.04) 
[197] 
 
0.41 (0.03) 
[203] 
 
 
 
Note: means as main number, standard deviation in parentheses, and number of 
observations in brackets. The pooled data contain observations from one matrilineal and one 
patriarchal revisited village, in which an exact replication of our experiment in 2008 was 
done.  
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TABLE 2B: Marginal Effects of Logistic Regression,  
Data from Revisited Villages Pooled 
  
Younger -0.10 
(0.14)    
Older  0.02 
(0.16)    
Girls  0.03 
(0.15)                      
Younger girls -0.19 
(0.18)      
Older girls -0.32** 
(0.13)   
Matrilineal -0.03 
(0.23)  
Younger Matrilineal   0.13 
(0.19)  
Older Matrilineal  0.05 
(0.18)  
Matrilineal girls -0.13 
(0.17)  
Younger Matrilineal girls  0.29 
(0.22)  
Older Matrilineal girls  0.37** 
(0.16)  
Performance -0.02 
(0.02) 
 
  
Note: Younger denotes children aged 7-9, 
Older denote children aged 13-15. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; clustered at 
the level of groups sent to competition. 
Controls for village and room-level effects 
added. *’s denote significance at levels; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Based on 548 
observations.  
 
 
